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i. ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we investigate whether credit watches and bond rating 
changes issued by Moodys’ and S&P Credit Rating Agencies provide significant 
new information to investors for Non-USA domiciled corporations.  We also 
examine whether the stock related cumulative abnormal return (CAR) differs 
according to the classification of the country of domicile (emerging or developed) 
of the corporation, and varies by state of the local stock market during the time of 
the rating event. 
 
We find that on average, negative credit watches as well as long term 
rating downgrades result in significant stock related CAR for Non-USA domiciled 
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corporations.  However, positive credit watches and long term rating upgrades 
generally do not result in significant stock related CAR.  On average, we find that 
negative credit watches result in a stock related CAR of -1.37% within the (-1, +1) 
window centered around the watch issuance, while long term rating downgrades 
result in a stock related CAR of -1.33% within the (-1, +1) window centered 
around the downgrade.  Developed markets generally exhibit a stronger reaction.  
Negative watch in developed markets have a stock related CAR of -1.44%, 
compared to only -0.88% for emerging markets.  The picture is similar for long 
term rating downgrades.  Downgrades in developed markets have a stock related 
CAR of -1.47%, compared to only -0.76% for emerging markets.  This paper 
provides evidence that credit rating agencies are able to provide new information 
to investors outside of companies domiciled in the USA. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) such as Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s 
play an important credit monitoring role within financial markets.  Bond ratings 
issued by these 2 agencies dominate the market, accounting for 90 – 95% of the 
world market share1, and are used by investors to determine the credit 
worthiness, and hence, required return on bond issues.   
 
The number of credit watch and bond rating changes issued by CRAs for 
companies domiciled outside of the USA has increased since 1990.  From our 
dataset, the annual frequency of issues on credit watch for companies domiciled 
outside of the USA increased from 29 in 1992 to 330 in 2006.  The annual 
frequency of issues on long term rating changes increased from 86 in 1992 to 
300 in 2006.    Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, there has not been 
any study that examines the informational value of bond rating changes for 
corporations domiciled outside of the USA.  Whether these ratings provide 
significant informational value to investors therefore remains to be seen – our 
study seeks to determine this.  We note that over 98.4% (or substantially all) of 
                                                 
1
 Credit Ratings of Long Term Bonds. Hilliard Lyons 
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the events in our sample are therefore related to companies with equity traded 
outside of the United States.   
 11 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Value and Effect of Credit Ratings 
The value of credit ratings have been debated within academic literature.  
Ederington and Yawitz (1987) find that most ratings can be predicted from 
publicly available information.  Wakeman (1990) argue that rating agencies 
summarize existing public information, lowering information costs, but not 
expanding information availability.  However, Jorion, Liu and Shi (2004) find that 
the informational effects of downgrades and upgrades are greater in the post-FD 
period (after 23 Oct 2000) because credit analysts at rating agencies still retain 
access to confidential information that is no longer available to equity analysts.   
 
The effect of credit rating changes issued by the CRAs have a mixed track 
record within the academic literature.  Prior work have used both bond and stock 
prices to examine the effect of rating changes.  Weinstein (1977) (monthly bond 
returns) and Wakeman (1978) (monthly stock and weekly bond returns) do not 
find a price reaction at the time of rating changes.  Katz (1974) (monthly changes 
in bond yields), Grier and Katz (1976) (average monthly bond prices) and 
Ingram, Brooks and Copeland (1983) (monthly changes in municipal bond yields) 
find significant bond price reactions.  Griffin and Sanvicente (1982), Wansley and 
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Clauretie (1985), Cornell et al (1989) generally find a significant negative reaction 
to bond downgrades.  They do not generally find a significant reaction to 
upgrades.  Wansley and Clauretie (1985) and Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) 
also observe significant negative returns prior to the actual downgrades.  
Similarly, Ederington and Goh (1998) examine trends in earnings before and 
after rating changes, and find that downgrades both precede and portent 
declines in earnings.  However, upgrades bear little relation to earnings (both 
before and after).   
 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) use a sample of 1,014 rating changes by 
Moody’s and S&P over the 1977 – 1982 period.  They report a statistically 
significant two-day abnormal average return of -2.66%.  Other than Wansley and 
Clauretie (1985) and Hand et el (1992), these papers examine only equity market 
reactions.  This is likely due to difficulty in obtaining reliable daily bond data.  
Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) (daily data on bond and stock prices) find 
significant excess bond returns for unexpected additions (using an expectations 
model based on bond yields) to creditwatch, although stock returns are only 
significant for additions to negative creditwatch.  For rating changes, the paper 
finds significant bond and stock price reaction to downgrades, but little evidence 
 13 
on effect of upgrades on bond and stock prices.  Dichev and Piotroski (2001) use 
all of Moody’s bond rating changes announcements from 1970 – 1997, 
representing a larger sample of 4,727 observations.  They also find a significant 
three-day price effect of -1.97% for downgrades, and 0.48% for upgrades.  Both 
results are significant, partially due to the increased power from the sample size.                              
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2.2 Differentiation of Downgrades by Deterioration in Firm’s Prospects 
and Increase in Leverage 
 
Goh and Ederington (1993) also categorize rating downgrades into those 
that are due to a deterioration in the financial prospects of the firm, and those 
that result from an increase in leverage.  The authors find that the former have 
negative implications for stockholders, while the latter, positive.  The authors also 
find that the first class of rating changes reflect the rating agency’s (Moody, in 
this case) projections of the firm’s future prospects, while the latter is based on 
past leverage increases.  Consequently, there is an observed significant negative 
stock reaction to the first class of downgrades, but not the second. 
 15 
 
3. CONTRIBUTION OF CURRENT STUDY 
3.1 Global Scope of Credit Watch and Bond Rating Changes 
The aforementioned studies are based on the effect of bond rating 
changes and credit watch for companies that are domiciled (or incorporated) in 
the United States (US).  To the best of our knowledge, there has not been any 
study on the effect of bond rating changes in international markets, outside of the 
US.  However, with the advent of globalization, many non-US corporations are 
also turning to bond issuance as a means of raising capital.  Consequently, the 
number of bond rating and credit watch events issued by the S&P and Moodys 
rating agencies on non-US domiciled companies have also increased.  Within our 
dataset, which reflects long-term bond rating changes as well as credit watches 
for fixed interest rate bonds and debentures for non-USA domiciled firms2 
between May 1991 and Jul 2007 for both credit watch as well as long term 
ratings, there are a total of 4,039 long-term bond rating events within the time 
period under observation as well as 3,287 credit watch events.  The number of 
long-term bond rating events each year increased from 47 events per year in 
                                                 
2
 Excluding bonds issued by Supra-National organisations (e.g. Asian Development Bank, IMF) 
as well as bonds issued by governments. 
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1991 and 86 events per year in 1992 to 300 events per year in 2006.  The 
number of credit watches increased from 29 in 1992 to 330 in 2006. 
 17 
 
3.2 Differences in National Regulatory Contexts 
Equity reactions to bond rating changes and credit watches issued by S&P 
and Moodys for non-US domiciled firms may differ from reactions by US 
domiciled firms.  As this is the first study focusing on non-US firms, it remains to 
be established whether S&P and Moodys ratings and credit watches provide 
significant new information for investors in the stock of non-US domiciled firms.   
 
One reason for any differences is that corporate governance and 
regulatory contexts vary globally.  One prominent example is Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (FD), which prohibits US domiciled firms from sharing private 
information with stock analysts, amongst other parties; post Reg FD, US 
domiciled firms are however still able to share private information with CRAs, 
therefore resulting in bond ratings and credit watches having a greater relative 
informational value over stock analysts’ upgrades / downgrades.  While this 
would tend to increase the post Reg FD stock price reaction to bond rating 
changes / credit watches for US-domiciled firms, a similar effect may not be 
present for non-US domiciled companies as Reg FD does not apply to firms that 
are not regulated by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).    
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3.3 Effectiveness of Rating Methodology outside USA 
Another reason is that it rating agencies need to establish an effective 
relationship with the issuer in order to obtain non-public information for the rating 
process.  It remains to be seen whether S&P and Moodys have been able to 
achieve this effectively with non-US domiciled firms.  According to Jorion (2005), 
rating agencies typically begin the process of ratings following a request by 
corporations for ratings issuance in advance of issuing debt.  Agencies then 
assign a team with relevant industry expertise, and there is also one primary 
analyst who takes the lead in making regular contact, establishing a relationship 
with the issuer and overseeing the rating process.  The actual ratings are based 
on both public information (e.g. accounting ratios) and nonpublic information 
(profit breakdowns, product plans, financial projections, etc).  The efficacy of the 
rating process may therefore vary between emerging and developed markets, as 
rating agencies may take time to familiarize themselves with the operations, 
organizational culture and senior management of firms in emerging markets.  
Additionally, the composition of ‘public information’ may differ between developed 
and emerging markets.  It is likely that more information is ‘public’ in developed 
markets because of more established regulatory authorities as well as deeper 
 19 
capital markets.  We therefore segregate our results by developed / emerging 
markets, using the Morgan Stanley Capital Index country classification as a 
guide. 
 20 
 
3.4 Linkages between Credit Watch and Bond Rating Changes 
Additionally, we also examine stock reactions after both credit watches 
and long term bond rating changes, and also the difference between bond rating 
changes that were previously foreshadowed by credit watches (collectively 
termed “expected” bond rating changes), versus bond rating changes that were 
not foreshadowed (collectively termed “unexpected” bond rating changes).  To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first study of its kind that considers the 
linkage between credit watch as well as bond rating changes.  Our study is 
otherwise global in nature, but excludes US-domiciled companies as there is 
already a large volume of research on the impact of bond rating changes and 
credit watches on these firms.   
 21 
3.5 Summary of Significant Empirical Findings 
We find that on average, negative credit watch as well as long term rating 
downgrades induce significant stock price reactions over a (-1, +1) period with 
day 0 being the event day itself.  Negative credit watches induce an average 
stock related CAR of -1.37% (t-statistic of –7.15) while long term rating 
downgrades induce a reaction of -1.33% (t-statistic of –7.11) over the 3 day 
period for the entire sample.  The average stock-related CAR associated with 
positive credit watch is 0.13% (t-statistic of 0.90) while the stock related CAR 
associated with long term rating upgrades is 0.07% (t-statistic of 0.75).  Both 
stock-related CARs for positive credit watch and upgrades are not significant at 
the 2.5% level of significance (1-tail test).  Hence, it appears that negative events 
result in a significant stock price reaction, while positive events do not.  
Additionally, the act of being put on credit watch is itself an informative event. 
 
We also find that stock-related CAR in developed markets is stronger than 
stock-related CAR in emerging markets, for negative credit watch and long term 
rating downgrades.  Stock-related CAR associated with a negative credit watch 
in developed markets is -1.44% (t-statistic of –6.79), compared to -0.88% for 
negative credit watch in emerging markets (t-statistic of –2.27).  Additionally, 
 22 
stock-related CAR associated with long term ratings downgrades in developed 
markets is –1.47% (t-statistic of –6.84), compared to only –0.76% (t-statistic of    
–2.08) for long term ratings downgrades in emerging markets.  Regression 
analysis (Table 13) confirms that being domiciled in a developed market results 
in a more negative reaction to long term rating downgrades; reactions are more 
negative by -1.11% on average, compared to companies domiciled in emerging 
markets.  Also, being domiciled in a developed market results in the reaction to 
negative credit watch being more negative by -0.63% compared to emerging 
markets. 
 
The results for upgrades when partitioned between developed / emerging 
markets are mixed and not significant at the 2.5% level of significance (1-tailed 
test).  Positive credit watch in developed markets result in a 0.10% stock-related 
CAR, compared to 0.30% for emerging markets.  Additionally, long term rating 
upgrades in developed markets result in a 0.08% CAR, and a 0.03% CAR in 
emerging markets. 
 
Goh and Edderington (’98) argue that good news is typically released 
more readily by corporations relative to bad news.  Hence, positive credit 
 23 
watches / long term rating upgrades represent minimal new information to 
investors compared to negative credit watches / long term rating downgrades.  
This could explain why negative credit watches / downgrades result in a more 
significant stock price reaction compared to positive credit watches / upgrades. 
 
Moreover, the greater stock-related CAR to negative credit watches and 
rating downgrades in developed markets compared to emerging markets 
indicates that the credit watches and ratings generally provide investors with 
more new information in developed markets.  The greater efficacy of the ratings 
process in developed markets may be due to enhanced disclosure standards; 
rating agencies may base their decisions partially on publicly available 
information, which are fed into proprietary models.  Additionally, laws governing 
insider trading / other corporate governance measures may be more stringent in 
developed markets.  Hence, information leakage in emerging markets may be 
more pronounced, therefore resulting in a smaller reaction upon rating changes.  
 
Furthermore, when the results are further segregated by whether the 
credit watches are eventually resolved by long term rating changes (termed 
‘informative’ credit watches and ‘expected’ rating changes respectively), or not 
 24 
resolved (termed ‘uninformative’ credit watches, with unlinked rating changes 
termed ‘unexpected’ rating changes), we find that informative credit watches and 
surprised rating changes generally have more significant reactions.   
 
Informative negative credit watches in developed (emerging) markets 
have an average reaction of –1.82% (-1.76%) during the 3 day window, 
compared to –1.11% (-0.38%) for non-informative negative credit watches.  The 
t-statistics for uninformative negative credit watch in emerging markets are not 
significant at the 2.5% level of significance.  Additionally, surprise long term 
ratings downgrades in developed (emerging) markets have an average reaction 
of –2.09% (-0.85%) during the 3 day window, compared to –0.85% (-0.49%) 
during the 3 day window for expected long term ratings downgrades.  The t-
statistics for the emerging markets surprise and expected downgrades are not 
significant.  This may also be due to the smaller number of observations for 
events in the emerging markets, which reduces the power of the test. 
 
Positive credit watches / upgrades generally resulted in insignificant stock-
related CARs, except in the case of expected long term rating upgrades in 
emerging markets, which resulted in an average reaction of 1.33% (t-statistic of 
 25 
2.86 significant at the 2.5% level of significance).  This is likely due to the fact 
that most of the rating events in this category occurred during months where the 
broader stock indices for those countries exhibited strongly positive returns.  The 
average MSCI country index return during expected long term rating upgrades in 
emerging markets was 2.23%, compared to 1.13% on average for all long term 
rating upgrades.  We subsequently demonstrate that the local MSCI country 
index return has a significant impact on the returns associated with long term 
rating upgrades but not with long term rating downgrades.  A 1 percentage pt 
increase in local MSCI country index return results in an additional 3.89% 
percentage pt increase in stock-related CAR after long term rating upgrades.  
The effect is not significant for bond downgrades.  An explanation for this is that 
investors consider the broader macroeconomic context in tempering CRAs’ 
opinion of a corporation’s improved prospects going forward.  However, they 
react negatively to news of a corporation’s declining prospects regardless of how 
the economy is performing, indicating that investors may “assume the worst” 
after long term rating downgrades. 
 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows.  Section 4 - 6 
describes background to credit rating agencies, data and sample characteristics, 
 26 
Section 7 - 8 discussed the empirical methodologies and the Welch t-test which 
we use to compare sample means, Section 9 presents overall empirical findings 
and also partitions results by various characteristics (e.g. country of domicile, 
etc), Section 10 investigates the possibility of insider trading by examining 
preannouncement trading effects, Section 11 performs cross section analysis 
and further discusses the possibility of insider trading, and lastly, Section 12 
provides concluding remarks and future directions for research. 
 27 
 
4. BACKGROUND 
 
Table 1 shows the distribution of bond rating changes released by the 2 
major rating agencies, Moody’s and S&P.  Together, these 2 agencies account 
for over 90 – 95% of the global market.  The table shows long term bond ratings, 
which also incorporates the rating agencies’ opinion of the firm’s future 
prospects.  The ratings range from Aaa (for Moodys) and AAA (for S&P), which 
denotes the most credit worthy issues, to C (for Moodys) and D (for S&P) for the 
least credit worthy issues (already in default).   
 
There are 2 main bands of ratings, investment grade and non-investment 
grade.  The bandings are significant because the yield to maturity required of the 
issues increase dramatically between rating bands.  Additionally, some pension / 
mutual funds and other investment houses may be prohibited by their mandates 
from holding non-investment grade rated debt, or prohibited from holding equity 
in firms that are non-investment grade rated.  The lowest investment grade rating 
is Baa3 for Moodys and BBB- for S&P. 
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Table 1
Moodys S&P
Aaa AAA Highest Investment Grade 1
Aa1 AA+ High Investment Grade 2
Aa2 AA High Investment Grade 3
Aa NA High Investment Grade 3
Aa3 AA- High Investment Grade 4
A1 A+ Upper Investment Grade 5
A2 A Upper Investment Grade 6
A NA Upper Investment Grade 6
A3 A- Upper Investment Grade 7
Baa1 BBB+ Medium Investment Grade 8
Baa2 BBB Medium Investment Grade 9
Baa NA Medium Investment Grade 9
Baa3 BBB- Medium Investment Grade 10
Ba1 BB+ Lower Speculative 11
Ba2 BB Lower Speculative 12
Ba NA Lower Speculative 12
Ba3 BB- Lower Speculative 13
B1 B+ Spec Speculative 14
B NA Spec Speculative 14
B2 B Spec Speculative 15
B3 B- Spec Speculative 16
Caa NA Poor Speculative 16
Caa1 CCC+ Poor Speculative 17
Caa2 CCC Poor Speculative 18
Caa3 CCC- Poor Speculative 19
Ca CC Hspec Speculative 20
C C Lowest Speculative 21
NA D Def Speculative 23
The list of bond ratings released by Moodys and S&P are mapped to 
ordinal values based on equivalence classes between the 2 rating 
agencies.  
Rating Agency
Type of Rating Band Ordinal Value
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5. DATA SOURCES 
We use four databases in the current study:  S&P Rating Changes 
database, Moody’s Default Risk Service database, Bloomberg Investors Service 
and daily stock price data from DataStream. 
 
Specifically, we have access to a large sample of credit watch placements 
(from May 1991 to Jul 2007) and bond rating changes (from Apr 1982 to Jul 
2007) from Moody’s Default Risk Service database, and also S&P Rating 
Changes database.  Both databases provide information on the beginning date 
and credit watch indications of a bond (i.e. at the issue level) as well as 
subsequent long term rating changes dates, and also the specific ratings.  We 
confine our sample to fixed rate non-ABS/CDO bonds issued by companies (i.e. 
excluding sovereign and supra-national entities such as the Asia Development 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, etc) domiciled outside the US, and 
examine only positive / negative credit watches, as well as upgrades / 
downgrades for long term rating changes.  Over 98.4% (or substantially all) of the 
events in our sample are therefore related to companies with equity traded 
outside of the United States.   
 30 
 
Secondly, we map the bond ISINs3 to stock ISINs for the parent 
companies involved by using Bloomberg Investors Service.  The parent 
companies’ stock ISIN is then used to retrieve daily stock price history from 
DataStream.  In total, over 919 unique companies are considered in our analysis.  
Companies without bond to stock ISIN mapping in Bloomberg Investors Service, 
or without price data history available in DataStream are not considered. 
 
In cases where credit watches are issued for several of a company’s 
bonds on the same day, we consider this as only one observation.  Similarly, 
where several of a company’s bonds are issued with upgrades / downgrades on 
the same day, we also consider this as a single observation.  In cases where 
some of a company’s bonds experience expected rating changes, while others 
do not on the same day, we consider the stock-related CAR as due to an 
expected rating change.  Thirdly, for the case where multiple bond rating 
changes related to the same issuer happen on the same day, we consider the 
                                                 
3
 An International Securities Identifying Number (ISIN) uniquely identifies a security (e.g bond / 
stock) with a structure as outlined in ISO 6166.  ISINs may cover bonds, commercial paper, 
equities and warrants.  The general structure of the ISIN code is a 12-character alpha-numerical 
code that does not contain information regarding the characteristics of the financial instrument but 
serves for uniform identification of a security at trading and settlement. 
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issue with the highest rating change magnitude, as this particular issue is likely to 
impact stock prices the most. 
 32 
 
6. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS FOR CREDIT WATCH 
PLACEMENT AND BOND RATING CHANGES 
 
Table 2 reports statistics on the number of credit watch placements and 
bond rating changes.  Table 3 reports the breakdown of informative / 
uninformative credit watches, and expected / unexpected rating changes.  We 
note that the number of rating changes as well as credit watches for international 
firms have increased steadily over time.  The annual frequency of issues on 
credit watch increased from 29 in 1992 to 330 in 2006.  The annual frequency of 
issues on long term rating changes increased from 86 in 1992 to 300 in 2006.  
Additionally, the total number of credit watches and bond rating changes are 
negatively skewed.  Of the total sample, 73.7% (60.3%) are negative watches 
(bond downgrades).  30.0% (44.7%) of long term rating upgrades (downgrades) 
are preceded by a positive (negative) credit watch.  Also, 51.9% (44.9%) of 
positive (negative) watches are resolved by upgrades (downgrades).   
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Year Number of Upgrades
Number of 
Downgrades
Number of
Positive Watches
Number of
Negative Watches Total
1991 0 28 0 1 29
1992 2 84 0 29 115
1993 7 75 7 52 141
1994 19 39 9 29 96
1995 38 53 19 58 168
1996 54 45 25 62 186
1997 76 138 52 163 429
1998 70 272 55 341 738
1999 94 202 67 200 563
2000 131 147 88 186 552
2001 119 396 60 316 891
2002 99 346 47 258 750
2003 103 221 55 174 553
2004 184 104 99 125 512
2005 253 104 94 132 583
2006 179 122 126 204 631
2007 
(until Jul) 176 59 61 93 389
Total 1,604 2,435 864 2,423 7,326
The combined sample of long term rating changes and credit watches from both Moody's Investor's Service and S&P 
Rating Agency from 1991 to 2007 for companies domiciled outside the United States is given below.  Only fixed rate 
bonds issued by corporations (i.e. excluding sovereign bonds and supranational organisations) are considered.  For 
cases where a corporation has several rating events / credit watches on the same day, only 1 event is considered - for 
rating changes, this is the event with the largest rating change magnitude.  The sample in 1991 begins from May, and 
ends in Jul in 2007.
Distribution of Long Term Rating Changes and Credit Watches from Moody's Investor's Service and 
S&P Rating Agency for a Sample of 1604 upgrades, 2435 downgrades, 864 positive watches and 2423 
negative watches from 1991 to 2007
Table 2
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Fig 1:  Number of Rating Events from Moodys and S&P for Non-US Domiciled 
Companies 
Fig 1 - Number of Rating Events from Moodys and S&P for Non-US Domiciled Companies
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Panel A: Positive Watch
Negative 
Watch Total
449 1,088 1,537
415 1,335 1,750
864 2,423 3,287
Panel B: Upgrades Downgrades
449 1,088 1,537
1,155 1,347 2,502
1,604 2,435 4,039
Table 3
Total:
Total:
Informative Credit Watches:
Uninformative Credit Watches:
Expected Rating Changes:
Unexpected Rating Changes:
Informative Credit Watches are defined as either negative credit watches that are resolved by a long term rating downgrade, or positive 
credit watches that are resolved by a long term rating upgrade within a year.  Conversely, uninformative credit watches are not resolved 
by a long term rating change in the correct direction, and unexpected rating changes are not preceded by a corresponding credit watch.  
In the case where only some of the bonds associated with a stock experience an 'expected' downgrade or upgrade on a particular day 
while other bonds that are downgraded or upgraded on the same day are not preceded by credit watches, the long term rating event for 
that stock is classfied as "expected"
Distribution of Informative / Uninformative Credit Watches and Expected / Unexpected Long Term 
Rating Changes
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7. METHODOLOGY 
 
We present our empirical findings in 3 stages.  First, we examine overall 
stock-related CAR arising from the company’s bonds being included on credit 
watch and subsequent bond rating changes.  This allows us to compare our 
findings to prior research on US firms, and also test for significance in the market 
reactions to credit watch emplacement and bond rating changes.   
 
Secondly, we present different partitions for our results – specifically, we 
analyze the stock-related CAR to credit watch emplacements and bond rating 
changes according to classification of country of domicile (whether developed or 
emerging, according to the Morgan Stanley Capital Index classification), and 
whether the credit watch / bond rating change is linked or unlinked.  Additionally, 
we also compare stock related CAR for rating change events that result in a 
change in rating bands (i.e. from investment grade to non-investment grade, and 
vice versa) with rating change events that do not result in a change in rating 
bands.  We also compare stock related CAR by state of the country’s MSCI index 
(“up” or “down”) to determine if CAR varies according to the state of the broader 
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market.   To the best of our knowledge, this latter partition has not been 
attempted by prior literature.  As a robustness check, we also examine 
consistency of our results at the country level.  
 
Thirdly, we utilize cross sectional regressions to determine the 
significance of various variables in explaining stock related CAR to credit 
watches and bond rating changes.   
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8. THE WELCH T - TEST 
 
In order to test for significant differences between sample means, we use 
the Welch t test, which is intended for use with two samples that may have 
unequal variances.  The Welch t test is therefore an approximate solution to the 
Behrens-Fisher problem4, which is the problem of hypothesis testing of the 
difference between the means of separate normally distributed independent 
populations where the variances of the populations are not assumed to be equal.   
 
The t statistic is therefore defined by the following formula: 

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The degrees of freedom v associated with this variance estimate is also 
approximated using the Welch-Satterthwaite equation: 
                                                 
4
 See Appendix A 
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The statistics are then used with the t-distribution to test the null 
hypothesis that the two means are equal.  
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9 INFORMATION CONTENT OF CREDIT WATCH 
PLACEMENT AND BOND RATING CHANGES 
 
9.1 Stock Related CAR for (-1, +1) for Entire Sample 
 
 
In order to determine whether credit watch emplacements as well as long 
term rating changes are informative events, we examine stock related CAR for a 
3 day (-1, +1) window around the events using a standard event study 
methodology.   
 
Culmulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) are calculated as the cumulative 
difference between the daily raw stock return and the concurrent local market 
index for each of the 42 countries in our sample, as defined in DataStream.  As a 
robustness check, we also repeat all analyses using an alternative window period 
of (-3, +3).  The choice of event window does not appear to alter the significance 
of our results. 
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Event Type Avg Stock Related CAR in (-1, +1) t-statistic
# of 
observations
Negative Credit Watch -1.37% -7.15 2,423
Positive Credit Watch 0.13% 0.90 864
Long Term Rating Downgrade -1.33% -7.11 2,435
Long Term Rating Upgrade 0.07% 0.75 1,604
Total: 7,326
Table 4
Average Stock Related Culmulative Abnormal Return (CAR) for 3 day period in window (-1, +1) centered around the 
credit event at day 0 is calculated as the difference between the daily raw stock return and the concurrent local market 
index (as defined in DataStream).
Average Stock Related CAR for (-1, +1) for Entire Sample for Positive / Negative Credit 
Watch and Long Term Rating Upgrade / Downgrades
 
Fig 2:  Stock Related CAR for Entire Sample 
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In Table 4 (also show in Fig 2), we consider four subsets of our sample.  
These are positive / negative credit watch placements, and long term bond rating 
upgrades / downgrades.  If bond rating agencies are able to provide new 
information to investors through credit watch placements or long term bond rating 
 41 
events, then we should observe a significant stock-related CAR corresponding to 
the credit watches / rating events.  We find that stock-related CAR to negative 
credit watch and bond rating downgrades are statistically significant.  CAR 
associated with negative credit watch is statistically significant at –1.37% (t-
statistic of –7.15).  CAR associated with bond rating downgrades are also 
statistically significant at –1.33% (t-statistic of –7.11).   
 
Conversely CAR associated with upgrades are generally not significant.  
There is only a 0.13% CAR associated with positive credit watch, and a 0.07 % 
CAR associated with bond rating upgrades (both with t-statistics that are not 
significant at the 2.5% level of significance).  Our findings are consistent with the 
bulk of academic literature on bond rating changes, e.g. Hand, Holthausen & 
Leftwich (1992), Goh & Ederington (1993 and 1998) and Hite & Warga (1997), 
which find that on the whole, bond rating downgrades are significant, while bond 
rating upgrades do not result in a significant price reaction, and therefore by 
extension, are not informative.  One possible explanation for this is that firms 
tend to disseminate good news aggressively, while withholding bad news; hence, 
a bond rating downgrade provides more new information to investors (see Goh & 
Ederington, 1993). 
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9.2 Stock Related CAR for (-1, +1) by Economy Classification 
 
Avg Stock Related 
CAR in (-1, +1) t-statistic
# of 
observations
Negative Credit Watch 
(Developed Markets) -1.44% -6.79 2,105
Negative Credit Watch 
(Emerging Markets) -0.88% -2.27 318
Welch t-test for difference 
in sample means
t-statistic = 1.2521
df = 524
Positive Credit Watch 
(Developed Markets) 0.10% 0.70 770
Positive Credit Watch 
(Emerging Markets) 0.30% 0.76 94
Welch t-test for difference 
in sample means
t-statistic = 0.4592
df = 121
Total: 3,287
Table 5
Average Stock Related CAR for (-1, +1) for Entire Sample of Positive / Negative Credit 
Watches partitioned by Classification of Country of Domicile
Average Stock Related Culmulative Abnormal Return (CAR) for 3 day period in window (-1, +1) centered around the 
credit event at day 0 is calculated as the difference between the daily raw stock return and the concurrent local market 
index (as defined in DataStream).
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Fig 3:  Stock Related CAR for Credit Watch by Classification of Economy 
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Comparing market reactions to negative credit watch emplacement and 
bond rating downgrades between developed markets and emerging markets in 
Table 5, we find that developed markets generally exhibit a larger reaction to 
negative credit watch and bond rating downgrades compared to emerging 
markets.  Developed markets have an average stock-related CAR of -1.44% (t-
statistic of –6.79) for negative credit watch emplacements, compared to only -
0.88% (t-statistic of –2.27) for emerging markets.  Additionally, developed 
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markets have an average stock related CAR of -1.47% (t-statistic of –6.84) for 
bond rating downgrades, compared to only -0.76% (t-statistic of –2.08) for 
emerging markets (Table 6).  Results for positive credit watch / upgrades when 
segregated by classification of economy are not significant.  These results 
indicate that rating agencies’ announcements for companies domiciled in 
developed markets carry greater new information content compared to 
announcements related to companies domiciled in emerging markets.  This could 
be due to greater information leakage in emerging markets due to fewer 
restrictions against insider trading, etc.  We investigate preannouncement trading 
effects as a proxy of insider trading in subsequent sections. 
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Avg Stock Related 
CAR in (-1, +1) t-statistic
# of 
observations
Long Term Rating Downgrade 
(Developed Markets) -1.47% -6.836782681 1,954
Long Term Rating Downgrade 
(Emerging Markets) -0.76% -2.083303349 481
Welch t-test for difference 
in sample means
 t-statistic = 1.6853
df = 848
Long Term Rating Upgrade 
(Developed Markets) 0.08% 0.774759269 1,205
Long Term Rating Upgrade 
(Emerging Markets) 0.03% 0.147906626 399
Welch t-test for difference 
in sample means
t-statistic = 0.2644
df = 690
Total: 4,039
Table 6
Average Stock Related CAR for (-1, +1) for Entire Sample of Long Term Rating Upgrades / 
Downgrades partitioned by Classification of Country of Domicile
Average Stock Related Culmulative Abnormal Return (CAR) for 3 day period in window (-1, +1) centered around the 
credit event at day 0 is calculated as the difference between the daily raw stock return and the concurrent local market 
index (as defined in DataStream).
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Fig 4:  Stock Related CAR for Rating Change by Classification of Economy 
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9.3 Stock Related CAR for (-1, +1) by Linkage between CW and RC 
 
Table 7 and 8 reports results that are additionally segregated by 
informative / uninformative credit watch, and expected / unexpected bond rating 
changes.  Our results indicate that being put on credit watch is an effective tool to 
reduce stock price volatility around actual bond rating changes.  In developed 
markets, the stock related CAR surrounding a surprise long term rating 
downgrade is -2.09%, compared to -0.85% in the case of an expected long term 
rating downgrade.  Similarly, for emerging markets, the stock related CAR 
surrounding a surprise long term rating downgrade is -0.85%, compared to -
0.49% for expected long term rating downgrades (t-statistics for the emerging 
market average reactions are not significant at the 2.5% level of significance).  
The maller difference for emerging markets could be that information leakage 
has reduced the informational advantage that unexpected downgrades have over 
expected downgrades.  
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Event Type Average Stock Related CAR(t-statistics in parantheses) # of observations
Surprise Long Term Downgrades -1.76%(-5.97) 1,347
Expected Long Term Downgrades -0.81%(-3.89) 1,088
Welch t-test for difference in 
sample means
t-statistic = 2.6304
df = 2312
Surprise Long Term Upgrades 0.02%(0.18) 1,155
Expected Long Term Upgrades 0.19%(1.28) 449
Welch t-test for difference in 
sample means
t-statistic = 0.9277
df = 974
Surprise Long Term Downgrades
(Developed Markets)
-2.09% 
(-5.74) 983
Expected Long Term Downgrades
(Developed Markets)
-0.85% 
(-3.75) 971
Welch t-test for difference in 
sample means
t-statistic = 2.9038
df = 1636
Surprise Long Term Downgrades
(Emerging Markets)
-0.85%
(-1.85) 364
Expected Long Term Downgrades
(Emerging Markets)
-0.49%
(-1.06) 117
Welch t-test for difference in 
sample means
t-statistic = 0.5355
df = 343
Surprise Long Term Upgrades
(Developed Markets)
0.12% 
(0.92) 824
Expected Long Term Upgrades
(Developed Markets)
-0.01%
(-0.08) 381
Welch t-test for difference in 
sample means
t-statistic = 0.6693
df = 950
Surprise Long Term Upgrades
(Emerging Markets)
-0.24%
(-1.26) 331
Expected Long Term Upgrades
(Emerging Markets)
1.33%
(2.86) 68
Welch t-test for difference in 
sample means
t-statistic = 3.1209
df = 91
Total:  4,039
Average Stock Related CAR for 3 day period in window (-1, +1) centered around long term rating event on 
day 0 partitioned by whether the rating event was preceded by a credit watch or not in the correct direction 
within a year.
Average Stock Related CAR for Entire Sample, Partitioned by whether Rating 
Change is Surprised or Expected (i.e. preceded by corresponding credit watch)
Table 7
Panel C:  Upgrades by Market Type
Panel A:  Overall Sample
Panel B:  Downgrades by Market Type
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Event Type Average Stock Related CAR(t-statistics in parantheses) # of observations
Informative Negative Credit Watch -1.81%(-6.61) 1,088
Uninformative Negative Credit Watch -1.00%(-3.79) 1,335
Welch t-test for difference in 
sample means
t-statistic = 2.1183
df = 2377
Informative Positive Credit Watch 0.14%(0.75) 449
Uninformative Positive Credit Watch 0.11%(0.52) 415
Welch t-test for difference in 
sample means
t-statistic = 0.1079
df = 840
Informative Negative Credit Watch
(Developed Markets)
-1.82%
(-6.15) 972
Uninformative Negative Credit Watch
(Developed Markets)
-1.11%
(-3.71) 1,133
Welch t-test for difference in 
sample means
t-statistic = 1.6661
df = 2096
Informative Negative Credit Watch
(Emerging Markets)
-1.76%
(-2.55) 116
Uninformative Negative Credit Watch
(Emerging Markets)
-0.38%
(-0.81) 202
Welch t-test for difference in 
sample means
t-statistic = 1.6524
df = 217
Informative Positive Credit Watch
(Developed Markets)
0.08%
(0.38) 381
Uninformative Positive Credit Watch
(Developed Markets)
0.13%
(0.60) 389
Welch t-test for difference in 
sample means
t-statistic = 0.1806
df = 763
Informative Positive Credit Watch
(Emerging Markets)
0.49%
(1.02) 68
Uninformative Positive Credit Watch
(Emerging Markets)
-0.21%
(-0.32) 26
Welch t-test for difference in 
sample means
t-statistic = 0.8571
df = 53
Total:  3,287
Panel C:  Positive Watch
Panel B:  Negative Watch
Table 8
Average Stock Related CAR for Entire Sample, Partitioned by whether Credit 
Watch was Informative or Uninformative
Average Stock Related CAR for 3 day period in window (-1, +1) centered around credit watch on day 0 
partitioned by whether the credit watch was resolved by a rating event or not in the correct direction within 
a year.
Panel A:  Overall Sample
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Fig 5:  Stock Related CAR for Credit Watch by Informativeness 
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Fig 6:  Stock Related CAR for Rating Change by Linkage with CW 
Stock Related CAR for Rating Changes
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Su
rp
ris
e
 
Up
gr
ad
e
s
(D
ev
el
o
pe
d)
Su
rp
ris
e 
 
Up
gr
ad
es
(E
m
e
rg
in
g)
Ex
pe
c
te
d 
Up
gr
ad
e
s
(D
e
v
el
o
pe
d)
Ex
pe
c
te
d 
Up
gr
ad
e
s
(E
m
er
gi
n
g)
Su
rp
ris
e 
D
o
w
n
gr
ad
e
s
(D
e
v
e
lo
pe
d)
Su
rp
ris
e 
D
o
w
n
gr
ad
e
s
(E
m
er
gi
n
g)
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 
D
o
w
n
gr
ad
e
s
(D
ev
el
o
pe
d)
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 
D
o
w
n
gr
ad
e
s
(E
m
e
rg
in
g)% C
A
R
 
 
We note that the results for upgrades, segregated by expected or 
unexpected are also not significant, except for the case of expected upgrades in 
emerging markets.  In developed markets, the stock related CAR surrounding an 
expected long term rating upgrade is -0.01%, compared to 0.12% in the case of 
an unexpected long term rating upgrade (t-statistics not significant at 2.5% level).  
Similarly, for emerging markets, the stock related CAR surrounding an expected 
long term rating upgrade is 1.33% (t-statistic of 2.86 is significant), compared to -
0.24% for unexpected long term rating upgrades.  We note that the significant 
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results for expected upgrades in emerging markets may be due to the fact that a 
majority of events in this category occur when the country MSCI indices exhibit 
strongly positive returns.  The average MSCI country index returns during the 
month of expected upgrade events in emerging markets is 2.23%, compared to 
1.13% on average for upgrades in general.  Cross sectional regression analysis 
(Table 13) shows that the state of the MSCI country index (as a proxy for the 
macroeconomic environment in the corporation’s country of domicile) is 
significant in explaining variation in reactions to upgrades in general.  However, 
the same variable is not significant in explaining variation in reactions to 
downgrades.  This could be because investors weigh the strength of a 
corporation’s macroeconomic environment in tempering expectations of future 
positive prospects by rating agencies.   
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9.4 Stock Related CAR for (-1, +1) by Rating Band Transitions 
 
Event Type
Average Stock Related 
CAR
(t-statistics in 
parantheses)
# of observations
A1: Downgrades within Investment Grade -0.30%(-2.22) 1,297
A2: Downgrades to Speculative Grade -2.01%(-2.81) 271
A3: Downgrades within Speculative Grade -2.67%(-6.23) 867
Welch t-test for difference in sample means 
between sample A1 and sample A2
t-statistic = 2.3543
df = 289
Welch t-test for difference in sample means 
between sample A2 and sample A3
t-statistic = 0.7872
df = 478
A4: Upgrades within Investment Grade -0.11%(-1.30) 843
A5:Upgrades to Investment Grade 0.23%(1.32) 222
A6: Upgrades within Speculative Grade 0.28%(1.25) 539
Welch t-test for difference in sample means 
between sample A4 and sample A5
t-statistic = 1.7542
df = 333
Welch t-test for difference in sample means 
between sample A5 and sample A6
t-statistic = 0.1760
df = 732
Total: 4,039
B1: Downgrades within Investment Grade -0.36%(-2.66) 1,213
B2: Downgrades to Speculative Grade -2.38%(-2.63) 207
B3: Downgrades within Speculative Grade -3.65%(-5.84) 534
Welch t-test for difference in sample means 
between sample B1 and sample B2
t-statistic = 2.2084
df = 215
Welch t-test for difference in sample means 
between sample B2 and sample B3
t-statistic = 1.1577
df = 413
B4: Upgrades within Investment Grade -0.07%(-0.85) 747
B5: Upgrades to Investment Grade 0.02%(0.08) 153
B6: Upgrades within Speculative Grade 0.50%(1.48) 305
Welch t-test for difference in sample means 
between sample B4 and sample B5
t-statistic = 0.4163
df = 216
Welch t-test for difference in sample means 
between sample B5 and sample B6
t-statistic = 1.2333
df = 445
Total:  3,159
C1: Downgrades within Investment Grade 0.57%(0.80) 84
C2: Downgrades to Speculative Grade -0.82%(-1.07) 64
C3: Downgrades within Speculative Grade -1.08%(-2.29) 333
Welch t-test for difference in sample means 
between sample C1 and sample C2
t-statistic = 1.3336
df = 139
Welch t-test for difference in sample means 
between sample C2 and sample C3
t-statistic = 0.2973
df = 117
C4: Upgrades within Investment Grade -0.38%(-1.42) 96
C5: Upgrades to Investment Grade 0.70%(2.11) 69
C6: Upgrades within Speculative Grade -0.01%(-0.03) 234
Welch t-test for difference in sample means 
between sample C4 and sample C5
t-statistic = 2.5315
df = 141
Welch t-test for difference in sample means 
between sample C5 and sample C6
t-statistic = 1.6614
df = 163
Total:  880
Table 9
Panel B:  Developed Markets
Panel C:  Emerging Markets
Panel A:  Overall Sample
Average Stock Related CAR for Long Term Rating Events for 3 day period in window (-1, +1) centered around 
day 0 partitioned by whether the rating event results in a transition from investment grade to non-investment 
grade (for downgrades), and vice versa for upgrades
Average Stock Related CAR for Long Term Rating Events, Partitioned by whether 
Event results in an Investment Grade Transition
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Fig 7:  Stock Related CAR for Rating Change by Presence of Investment Grade 
Transitions
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Table 9 shows that rating downgrades which result in a change in rating 
bands (i.e. from investment grade to non-investment grade) result in a stronger 
stock-related CAR compared to rating changes.  In developed markets, rating 
downgrades that result in a change in rating bands (from investment grade to 
non-investment grade) have an average stock-related CAR of -2.38%, compared 
to -0.36% for rating downgrades that stay within the investment grade band (t-
statistics are –2.63 and –2.66 respectively).  In emerging markets, rating 
downgrades that result in a change to non-investment grade have an average 
stock-related CAR of -0.82%, compared to 0.57% for rating downgrades that stay 
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within the investment grade band – we note that for emerging markets, neither t-
statistic is significant at the 2.5% level of significance.     
 
We note that these results are consistent with findings from US markets, 
which show that downgrades within speculative grade result in the largest stock 
related CAR compared to downgrades within investment grade, and from 
investment grade to speculative grade.  This is because the largest increases in 
required yield to maturity of the bonds result from downgrades within the 
speculative grade. 
 
In developed markets, rating upgrades that result in a change in rating 
bands have an average stock-related CAR of 0.02%, compared to -0.07% for 
rating upgrades that stay within the investment grade band (both t-statistics are 
not significant).  In emerging markets, rating upgrades that result in a change in 
rating bands have an average stock-related CAR of 0.70%, compared to -0.38% 
for rating upgrades that stay within the investment grade band (the t-statistic for 
upgrades that cross the investment grade band in emerging markets is 
significant).   
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9.5 Stock Related CAR for (-1, +1) by State of Local Market 
 
Event Type
Average Stock Related 
CAR
(t-statistics in 
parantheses)
# of observations
Downgrades in Down Local Market -1.54%(-4.92) 1,120
Downgrades in Up Local Market -1.16%(-5.20) 1,315
Welch t-test for difference in sample means t-statistic = 0.9855df = 2085
Upgrades in Down Local Market 0.01%(-0.09) 619
Upgrades in Up Local Market 0.12%(1.17) 985
Welch t-test for difference in sample means t-statistic = 0.6816df = 1067
Total:  4,039
Downgrades in Down Local Market -2.00%
(-5.26) 841
Downgrades in Up Local Market -1.08%
(-4.38) 1,113
Welch t-test for difference in sample means t-statistic = 2.0284df = 1496
Upgrades in Down Local Market 0.04%
(0.19) 464
Upgrades in Up Local Market 0.11%
(0.99) 741
Welch t-test for difference in sample means t-statistic = 0.2865df = 712
Total:  3,159
Downgrades in Down Local Market -0.15%
(-0.30) 279
Downgrades in Up Local Market -1.60%
(-3.14) 202
Welch t-test for difference in sample means t-statistic = 2.0115df = 466
Upgrades in Down Local Market -0.18%
(-0.73) 155
Upgrades in Up Local Market 0.16%
(0.63) 244
Welch t-test for difference in sample means t-statistic = 0.9613df = 381
Total:  880
Table 10
Average Stock Related CAR for Long Term Rating Events, Partitioned by whether 
Event occurs in an "Up' local market, or "Down" local market
Average Stock Related CAR for long term rating events for 3 day period in window (-1, +1) centered around day 0 
partitioned by whether the event occurs during an "up" local market or "down" local market
Panel A:  Overall Sample
Panel B:  Developed Markets
Panel C:  Emerging Markets
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Event Type
Average Stock Related 
CAR
(t-statistics in 
parantheses)
# of observations
Negative Credit Watch in Down Local Market -1.95%(-5.90) 1,144
Negative Credit Watch in Up Local Market -0.84%(-4.06) 1,279
Welch t-test for difference in sample means t-statistic = 2.8456df = 1948
Positive Credit Watch in Down Local Market -0.16%(0.67) 331
Postive Credit Watch in Up Local Market 0.10%(0.61) 533
Welch t-test for difference in sample means t-statistic = 0.1939df = 640
Total:  3,287
Negative Credit Watch in Down Local Market
(Developed Markets)
-2.19%
(-5.75) 959
Negative Credit Watch in Up Local Market
(Developed Markets)
-0.81%
(-3.66) 1146
Welch t-test for difference in sample means t-statistic = 3.1168df = 1572
Positive Credit Watch in Down Local Market
(Developed Markets)
0.17%
(0.66) 289
Positive Credit Watch in Up Local Market
(Developed Markets)
0.06%
(0.36) 481
Welch t-test for difference in sample means t-statistic = 0.3412df = 560
Total:  2,875
Negative Credit Watch in Down Local Market
(Emerging Markets)
-0.74%
(-1.37) 185
Negative Credit Watch in Up Local Market
(Emerging Markets)
-1.08%
(-1.97) 133
Welch t-test for difference in sample means t-statistic = 0.4416df = 306
Positive Credit Watch in Down Local Market
(Emerging Markets)
0.09%
(0.13) 42
Positive Credit Watch in Up Local Market
(Emerging Markets)
0.47%
(1.02) 52
Welch t-test for difference in sample means t-statistic = 0.4709df = 75
Total:  412
Table 11
Average Stock Related CAR for Credit Watch Events, Partitioned by whether Event 
occurs in an "Up' local market, or "Down" local market
Average Stock Related CAR for credit watch events for 3 day period in window (-1, +1) centered around day 0 
partitioned by whether the event occurs during an "up" local market or "down" local market
Panel A:  Overall Sample
Panel B:  Developed Markets
Panel C:  Emerging Markets
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Fig 8:  Stock Related CAR by State of the Local Market Index 
Stock Related CAR by State of Market
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Additionally, Table 10 & 11 shows that rating downgrades in developed 
markets that occur during periods where the local MSCI country index is up 
exhibit less negative returns.  Rating downgrades in developed markets that 
occur when the local MSCI country index is up have an average stock-related 
CAR of -1.08%, compared to -2.00% when the index is down.  The picture is not 
as clear in emerging markets.  Rating downgrades in emerging markets that 
occur when the local MSCI country index is up have an average stock-related 
CAR of -1.60%.  As the average stock-related CAR of -0.15% when the index is 
down is not significant (t-statistic of -0.30), there is no basis for making the same 
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comparison as with developed markets.  As seen in table 10, none of the t-
statistics for the average stock-related CAR with upgrades are significant.   
Negative Credit Watch in developed markets also exhibit a less negative stock 
related CAR when the local MSCI index is up.  Stock related CAR is –1.95% in a 
down market, compared to –0.84% in an up market.  All t-statistics are significant 
at the 2.5% level of significance.  For emerging markets, the stock related CAR 
to negative credit watch in a down local market is not significant at the 2.5% level 
of significance, so there is no basis for comparison.   
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10. PREANNOUNCEMENT TRADING EFFECTS 
 
We note that there is some evidence of insider trading in both developed 
and emerging markets for long term downgrades, with a greater 
preannouncement effect in the form of negative abnormal returns in emerging 
markets.  Table 12 shows that in the -50 to -26 day window before a long term 
ratings downgrade, developed (emerging) markets exhibit an average stock 
related CAR of -2.35% (-2.79%).  Both sets of averages have significant t-
statistics of -9.04 (-3.35).  However, in the -25 to -1 day window before the 
downgrade, emerging markets exhibit a much larger -3.42% abnormal CAR, 
compared to only -1.84% for developed markets.  Once again, both sets of t-
statistics are significant at -7.08 (-3.69).   
 
The larger preannouncement reaction for emerging markets is also 
verified by the Welch t-test, which has a t-statistic of 1.64 for the difference 
between preannouncement reactions in the 2 class of markets in the -25 to -1 
window.  We also note that all the t-statistics for the preannouncement 
announcements in (-50, -26) and (-25, -1) for both markets are significant.  For 
negative credit watch, we note that there is no basis for comparison of magnitude 
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of insider trading because the t-statistics for preannouncement effects in 
emerging markets are all not significant.   
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Avg Stock Related CAR 
in (-50, -26)
(t-statistic in 
parantheses)
Avg Stock Related CAR 
in (-25, -1)
(t-statistic in 
parantheses)
# of observations
Negative Credit Watch 
(Developed Markets)
-1.51%
(-6.91)
-1.95%
(-8.27) 2,087
Negative Credit Watch 
(Emerging Markets) -0.11%(-0.16)
0.24%
(0.17) 302
Welch t-test for difference 
in sample means
 t-statistic = 1.9372
df = 363
 t-statistic = 2.1822
df = 336
Positive Credit Watch 
(Developed Markets) -0.03%(-0.12)
0.24%
(0.84) 743
Positive Credit Watch 
(Emerging Markets)
-1.92
(-1.86)
-0.11
(-0.11) 88
Welch t-test for difference 
in sample means
 t-statistic = 1.7639
df = 100
 t-statistic = 1.6396
df = 516
Total: 3,220*
Long Term Rating 
Downgrade (Developed 
Markets)
-2.35%
(-9.04)
-1.84%
(-7.08) 1,933
Long Term Rating 
Downgrade (Emerging 
Markets)
-2.79%
(-3.35)
-3.42%
(-3.69) 446
Welch t-test for difference 
in sample means
 t-statistic = 0.5046
df = 534
 t-statistic = 1.6396
df = 516
Long Term Rating Upgrade 
(Developed Markets)
0.41%
(1.96)
0.26%
(1.25) 1,183
Long Term Rating Upgrade 
(Emerging Markets)
-0.35%
(-0.66)
0.11%
(0.22) 367
Welch t-test for difference 
in sample means
t-statistic = 1.3236
df = 481
t-statistic = 0.3435
df = 102
Total: 3,929*
*not all obs in sample have preannouncement stock prices available
*not all obs in sample have preannouncement stock prices available
Table 12
Average Preannouncement Stock Related CAR for (-50, -26) and (-25, -1) for Entire Sample of Positive / 
Negative Creditwatch and Long Term Rating Upgrades / Downgrades 
Average Preannouncement Stock Related Culmulative Abnormal Return (CAR) for 2 periods, (-50, -26) & (-25, -1) 
is calculated as the difference between the daily raw stock return and the concurrent local market index (as 
defined in DataStream).  We note that not all the observations in the previous samples have preannouncement 
stock prices available.
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11. CROSS SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF EXCESS STOCK 
RETURNS 
11.1 Explanatory Variables  
 
We estimate multivariate regressions to try to explain cross-sectional 
variation in the stock-related CAR due to credit watch and bond rating changes.  
Using the same methodology as Jorion (2004), Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich 
(1992), etc, separate regressions are estimated for upgrades and downgrades.  
The following variables are included in the regression: 
1. Rating change magnitude, represented by a cardinal variable that 
indicates the number of grades changed (with AAA having a score of 1, 
and D having a score of 26), and the variable being new score – old 
score.   
2. For rating changes, a dummy variable set to 1 if the rating change is not a 
resolution of a prior credit watch.  The criteria for resolution is that the 
rating change is in the same direction as the credit watch, occurs within 1 
year of the credit watch, and is the earliest rating change for that specific 
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bond after the credit watch.  For credit watch, this is set to 1 if the credit 
watch was informative. 
3. For rating changes, a dummy variable set to 1 if the rating change moves 
the bond into or out of investment grade. 
4. A dummy variable set to 1 if the credit watch / rating change occurs to a 
company domiciled in an developed market country, as defined in the 
Morgan Stanley Capital Index classification. 
5. The monthly return of the MSCI country index for the country of domicile 
of the company during the month of the rating change. 
6. Time lapse since the last rating change 
7. Market capitalization of company during the credit watch / rating change. 
8. A dummy variable set to 1 if the country enforces prohibitions against 
insider trading – i.e., the country has previously persecuted insider 
trading. 
9. An index score of Anti Director Provisions, as a proxy for shareholder 
rights.  This proxy of country level corporate governance provisions is 
used as defined in “Law and Finance”, La Porta, Harvard University, ’98.  
The index is the sum of the following dummy variables (as defined and 
reproduced from La Porta ’98):  
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a. One share - one vote: Equals one if the Company Law or 
Commercial Code of the country requires that ordinary shares 
carry one vote per share, and zero otherwise. Equivalently, this 
variable equals one when the law prohibits the existence of both 
multiple-voting and non-voting ordinary shares and does not allow 
firms to set a maximum number of votes per shareholder 
irrespective of the number of shares she owns, and zero otherwise. 
b. Proxy by mail: Equals one if the Company Law or Commercial 
Code allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm, and 
zero otherwise. 
c. Shares not blocked before meeting: Equals one if the Company 
Law or Commercial Code does not allow firms to require that 
shareholders deposit their shares prior to a General Shareholders 
Meeting thus preventing them from selling those shares for a 
number of days, and zero otherwise. 
d. Cumulative voting or proportional representation: Equals one if the 
Company Law or Commercial Code allows shareholders to cast all 
of their votes for one candidate standing for election to the board of 
directors (cumulative voting) or if the Company Law or Commercial 
 66 
Code allows a mechanism of proportional representation in the 
board by which minority interests may name a proportional number 
of directors to the board, and zero otherwise. 
e. Oppressed minorities mechanism: Equals one if the Company Law 
or Commercial Code grants minority shareholders either a judicial 
venue to challenge the decisions of management or of the 
assembly or the right to step out of the company by requiring the 
company to purchase their shares when they object to certain 
fundamental changes, such as mergers, assets dispositions and 
changes in the articles of incorporation. The variable equals zero 
otherwise. Minority shareholders are defined as those 
shareholders who own 10 percent of share capital or less.  
f. Preemptive rights: Equals one when the Company Law or 
Commercial Code grants shareholders the first opportunity to buy 
new issues of stock and this right can only be waved by a 
shareholders’ vote, and zero otherwise. 
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11.2 Expected Signs  
 
The stock-related CAR should be more positive depending on the number 
of grades changed by the rating, and should also be smaller in absolute 
magnitude for resolutions of a credit watch.  Additionally, the absolute magnitude 
of the rating change should also be larger for rating changes that moves the 
bond across investment grades, if the bond is related to a company that is 
domiciled in a developed country and if it has been longer since the last credit 
watch / rating change (since the incremental amount of new information is 
greater).   
 
Market capitalization is also included in the model – we hypothesize that 
information availability on larger firms (by market capitalization) would be greater, 
therefore reducing the informational value of assessments by credit rating 
agencies.  Additionally, the stock related CAR for observations in countries 
where insider trading laws are enforced should be greater because there will be 
less information leakage, therefore resulting in the credit event having greater 
informational value.   
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Lastly, we hypothesize that the more rights shareholders have over the 
firm’s management (as proxied by the anti director rights variable), the more 
positive the reaction to all rating events should be.  While rating events represent 
(to some degree), the release of private information to investors, investors have 
an increased capacity to take action and prevent management from acting 
contrary to their interests.   
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3 Day Stock Related 
CAR for Positive CW t-statistic
3 Day Stock 
Related CAR for 
Negative CW 
t-statistic
3 Day Stock 
Related CAR for 
Long Term 
Upgrade 
t-statistic
3 Day Stock 
Related CAR for 
Long Term 
Downgrade
t-statistic
Dependent Variables
Intercept 0.010935686 1.199305909 -0.005486805 -0.538286329 -0.003191999 -0.724052857 -0.004611493 -0.4634405
Marketcap of Company in US 
$Billions 3.25005E-12 0.56088607 6.19396E-12 0.978345961 -2.47176E-12 -0.931894101 1.10295E-11 1.8079253
Company is Domiciled in 
Developed Market
-0.007038363 -1.022153037 -0.006256863 -0.805412774 0.001172058 0.430543861 -0.011118227 -1.7404421
Rating Change crosses 
Investment Grade Boundary - - - - 0.002698083 0.965929841 -0.01678223 -2.6114668
Surprised Rating Change - - - -
-3.29546E-05 -0.016112677 -0.00447095 -1.0708853
Return of Local MSCI Country 
Index
-0.000574349 -0.015981328 0.081633803 3.146301821 0.038899573 2.421862194 0.013415839 0.6201031
Rating Change Magnitude - - - - 0.000345362 0.56394421 1.44873E-05 0.0093546
Interval Since Last Rating 
Change 6.24675E-07 0.163419916 7.54837E-06 1.687050207 -9.81837E-07 -0.517271074 1.20871E-05 2.9363613
Informative Credit Watch -0.000854063 -0.22437229 -0.000828463 -0.175801846 - - - -
Anti Director Rights -0.000400604 -0.33859153 -0.000678976 -0.509233845 0.000662591 0.9530569 -0.000563936 -0.3693984
Insider Trading Laws 
Enforcement -0.002972361 -0.508222361 -0.004162292 -0.521063814 0.001265603 0.407668033 -0.003184623 -0.425067
Number of Observations 591 1,703 1,097 1,602
Adjusted R Square -0.008684848 0.00560917 0.000469852 0.01088287
R Square 0.003222055 0.009684542 0.008677673 0.016443179
Standard Error 0.041143432 0.079133616 0.030349699 0.079843862
Independent Variables
Table 13
CAR is the culmulative abnormal stock related return over the 3 day period (-1, +1).  Informative Dummy, Developed Markets Dummy,  Investment Grade Transition Dummy and Surprise Dummy are 
dummy variable that are 1 if the credit watch is informative, if the observation is for a company domiciled in an developed markets country, if the rating change results in an investment grade transition, 
and if the rating change is not foreshadowed by credit watch respectively.  Contemporaneous MSCI Returns is the return on the MSCI country index for the country of domicile for the month of the rating 
change.  Interval Since Last Rating Change is the number of days since the last rating change event, and Rating Change Magnitude is the new rating score - the old rating score, with AAA having a score 
of 1 and D having a score of 26.  Anti Director rights is the index score on country level corporate governance provisions as defined in "Law and Finance", La Porta, with a higher score indicating better 
corporate governance
CAR(rating change)j = B0 + B1(SURPRISE DUMMYj) + B2(DEVELOPED MARKETS DUMMYj) + B3(CONTEMPORANEOUS MSCI RETURNSj) + B4(MARKET CAPITALIZATIONj) 
+ B5(INTERVAL SINCE LAST RATING CHANGEj) + B6(RATING CHANGE MAGNITUDEj) + B7(INVESTMENT GRADE TRANSITIONj) + B8(INSIDER TRADING LAWS 
ENFORCEMENT) + B9 (ANTI DIRECTOR RIGHTS)
CAR(credit watch)j = B0 + B1(INFORMATIVE DUMMYj) + B2(DEVELOPED MARKETS DUMMYj) + B3(CONTEMPORANEOUS MSCI RETURNSj) + B4(MARKET 
CAPITALIZATIONj) + B5(INTERVAL SINCE LAST RATING CHANGEj) + B6(INSIDER TRADING LAWS ENFORCEMENT) + B7(ANTIDIRECTOR RIGHTS)
Regression Tests on Excess Stock Returns for Companies with Credit Watch and Long Term Rating Changes by Moody's or Standard and Poor's from 1982 - 2007
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11.3 Regression Results 
 
The results in Table 13 shows that, for negative credit watch, there is a 
more negative reaction in developed markets.  In the regression used, the t-
statistic on the developed markets dummy variable is weakly significant at -
0.81, and the coefficient of -0.0063 implies that, holding all else constant, the 
marginal effect of being domiciled in an emerging market decreases the stock-
related CAR from the negative credit watch by 0.63 percentage points (i.e., it is 
more negative).     
 
Additionally, the coefficient of 0.0816 on the local MSCI country index 
returns implies that a 1% increase in the local contemporaneous (same month) 
MSCI country index returns increases returns during a negative credit watch by 
8.16% (i.e. the stock-related CAR is less negative).  Lastly, although the t-
statistics on market capitalization and interval since previous rating change are 
weakly significant, and the coefficients are in the correct direction, the 
coefficient values are extremely small, and do not constitute a large impact on 
stock-related CAR.  The coefficient on market capitalization indicates that an 
additional US$100 million in market capitalization only increases the stock 
related CAR by 0.062 % pts (but the average market capitalization for the entire 
sample is only US$128.35 million), while the coefficient on interval since 
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previous rating change indicates that an additional 100 days interval since 
previous rating change increases stock related CAR by only 0.075% pts.  None 
of the explanatory variables for positive credit watch are significant.  The 
regression for positive credit watch as a whole also has no explanatory power 
with a low adjusted R square.   
 
We note that investors may factor the state of the local MSCI country 
index more heavily for negative credit watch because they condition the 
probability that a downgrade will materialize on the state of the broader 
country’s economy.  However, for positive credit watch, it is possible that since 
companies more actively disseminate good news, investors are already well 
informed as to the possibility of a subsequent long term rating upgrade, and 
hence do not condition as heavily on the state of the broader country’s 
economy.  
 
Additionally, for long term rating downgrades, there is also a more 
negative reaction in developed markets.  In the regression used, the t-statistic 
on the developed markets dummy variable is -1.74, and the coefficient of -
0.01111 implies that, holding all else constant, the marginal effect of being 
domiciled in an emerging market decreases the stock related CAR by 1.11 
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percentage points (i.e. more negative).  As expected, downgrades that cross 
the investment grade band have a more negative reaction than downgrades 
that do not.  The t-statistic on the investment grade transition dummy is -2.61, 
and the coefficient value of -0.0168 implies that, all else being equal, rating 
downgrades that cross the investment grade band to non investment grade 
have a stock related CAR that is more negative (-1.68 % pts).  We note that 
although the t-statistics on market capitalization and interval since closest rating 
change are weakly significant, the coefficient values are too small to have a 
notable impact on stock related CAR.   
 
Lastly, the regression on rating upgrades demonstrate that the 
contemporaneous return on the local MSCI country index significantly impacts 
stock-related CAR.  The t-statistic of 2.42 is significant, and the coefficient of 
0.0389 implies that, holding all else constant, the marginal effect of a 1% point 
increase in the MSCI country index return results in a 3.89% pt increase in 
stock-related CAR.   
 
We note that MSCI country index returns is positively related to the stock 
related CAR following negative credit watch, but does not significantly affect the 
stock related CAR to positive credit watch.  Conversely, MSCI country index 
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returns is positively related to the stock related CAR following long term rating 
upgrades, but does not significantly affect the stock related CAR to long term 
rating downgrades.  The former is likely due to the fact that investors use the 
state of economy to determine whether a subsequent downgrade is likely, whilst 
the latter may be a result of the fact that long term ratings are forward looking 
with a greater time horizon than credit watches; investors may condition their 
reaction to good news on whether the broader economy is also performing well, 
since this could affect the company’s future good prospects in the long term.  
However, the fact that investors do not do this for bad news (i.e. downgrades) 
could indicate that all the bad news is already ‘factored’ in.  This could also 
explain why being domiciled in an emerging market versus developed market 
does not affect stock related CAR to long-term upgrades.  In short, investors 
primarily weigh broader market conditions most heavily in assessing potential 
positive future prospects implicit in an upgrade. 
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11.4 Discussion of Insider Trading Prohibitions  
 
With regards to insider trading, we note that the coefficients on the 
“insider trading laws enforced” dummy and “anti director rights” index variable 
indicates that the enforcement of insider trading laws increases the stock 
related CAR to negative CW by -0.42% (more negative) for insider trading laws, 
and by -0.07% for each point on the anti director rights index.  However, both 
coefficients have low t-statistics which are not significant at the 2.5% level of 
significance.  For long term downgrades, we note an increase of stock related 
CAR to downgrades by -0.32% (more negative) and -0.06% for each point on 
the anti director rights index.  Once again, both coefficients are not significant at 
the 2.5% level of significance. 
 
We note that one possible explanation for the significant 
preannouncement abnormal returns in emerging markets compared to 
developed markets (for long term downgrades), but the absence of a significant 
t-statistic for the insider trading law dummy in the regression could be the 
relative lack of effective enforcement of insider trading regulations in emerging 
markets compared to developed markets.  That is to say, it is possible that 
insider trading laws may not be entirely effective in preventing insider trading, 
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especially in emerging markets.  There is some evidence for this in the 
literature.     
 
In “Do Insider Trading Laws Work?”, European Financial Management 
Journal ’05, Bris shows that profits made by informed corporate insiders before 
tender offer announcements increase after new insider trading laws are first 
enforced.  The paper finds that laws that proscribe insider trading fail to 
eliminate profits made by insiders.  The prohibition then shifts the supply curve 
for insider trading, and therefore raises its price; insider trading therefore 
becomes more profitable after laws are introduced that prohibit it.  Additionally, 
law enforcement also raises the possibility of monopoly profits for anyone that 
can find a way to circumvent the law. 
 
These results are supported by existing literature that compare stock 
related returns to events in developed and emerging markets.  Bekaert & 
Harvey ’02 note in a paper “Research in emerging markets finance:  Looking to 
the Future” that emerging market equity returns have higher serial correlation 
than developed market returns.  This serial correlation is symptomatic of 
infrequent trading and slow adjustment to current information (Harvey ’95, 
Kawakatsu & Morey ’99), and therefore, emerging market returns are less likely 
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to be impacted by company-specific news announcements than developed 
market returns.  The paper suggests that insider trading occurs well before the 
release of information to the public.   
 
Additionally, in a paper entitled “When an Event is not an Event:  The 
Curious Case of an Emerging Market”, Jan 2000 Journal of Financial 
Economics, Bhattacharya et al showed that shares trading in the Bolsa 
Mexicana de Valores (Mexican stock exchange) do not seem to react to 
company news. Using a sample of Mexican corporate news announcements 
from the period July 1994 through June 1997, this paper finds that there is 
nothing unusual about returns, volatility of returns, volume of trade or bid–ask 
spreads in the event window. The authors then provide evidence that suggests 
that unrestricted insider trading causes prices to fully incorporate the 
information before its public release.   
 
Bekaert & Harvey ’02 also point out that there is literature on stock 
selection in emerging markets that suggests that simple combinations of 
fundamental characteristics can be used to develop portfolios with excess 
returns to the benchmark (as demonstrated in Achour et al, ’99, Fama & 
French, ’98, Rouwenhorst, ’99, etc).  Bekaert & Harvey ’02 conclude that the 
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preponderance of evidence therefore suggests that emerging markets are 
relatively less informationally efficient than developed markets. 
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11.5 Country Breakdowns 
 
As a robustness check, we compute the average stock related CAR for 
each country for long term rating upgrades / downgrades and positive / negative 
credit watch (Table 14).  We find that for long term rating downgrades in 
developed countries, 90.9% of the developed countries in the sample have 
negative stock related CAR upon long term rating downgrade, and 61.1% of the 
emerging countries in the sample have negative stock related CAR upon long 
term rating downgrade.  Less than 50% of developed and emerging countries in 
the sample have positive stock related CAR upon long term rating upgrades.   
 
Table 14 shows that 78.3% of developed countries in the sample exhibit 
an average stock related CAR that is negative after negative credit watch.  
Additionally, 61.1% of emerging countries in the sample exhibit an average 
stock related CAR that is negative after negative credit watch.  54.6% of 
developed countries in the sample exhibit an average stock related CAR that is 
positive after positive credit watch, and 53.9% of emerging countries in the 
sample exhibit an average stock related CAR that is positive after positive credit 
watch. 
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Table 14
Country Positive Credit Watch Stock Related CAR
Negative Credit 
Watch Stock 
Related CAR
Long Term 
Upgrade Stock 
Related CAR
Long Term 
Downgrade Stock 
Related CAR
AUSTRALIA -0.43% -1.19% -0.03% -1.46%
AUSTRIA -0.32% 0.04% 0.42% -0.52%
BELGIUM -0.32% 0.98% -0.32% -2.07%
BRAZIL 0.00% -1.48% 0.17% -1.00%
CANADA 0.08% -0.69% 1.23% -1.56%
DENMARK 1.82% 5.65% 0.00% -0.40%
FINLAND 5.84% -2.13% -0.66% 0.19%
FRANCE -0.54% -1.74% -0.20% -1.28%
GERMANY -0.06% -0.35% -0.14% -1.03%
GREECE 3.00% 1.00% 0.02% 1.21%
HONG KONG 0.00% -1.13% 0.32% -0.59%
IRELAND 0.69% -0.63% -0.06% -3.23%
ITALY 0.14% -1.07% 0.17% -1.00%
JAPAN -0.08% -1.76% 0.15% -0.69%
NETHERLANDS -0.07% -5.15% -0.09% -3.44%
NEW ZEALAND 0.28% -1.46% -0.50% -0.01%
NORWAY -1.15% -2.55% -0.18% -6.67%
PORTUGAL 4.52% 0.46% 0.21% -0.09%
SINGAPORE N/A -4.00% -0.15% N/A
SPAIN 0.14% -0.17% -0.28% -0.57%
SWEDEN 0.01% -1.85% -0.50% -0.43%
SWITZERLAND 1.69% -9.25% 0.07% -5.06%
UNITED KINGDOM 0.36% -1.72% -0.08% -1.75%
# of countries 22 23 23 22
# of countries with 
average returns in the 
correct direction (i.e. > 0 
for positive watch and 
upgrades, and < 0 for 
negative watch and 
downgrades)
12 18 10 20
% of countries with 
average returns in 
correct direction
54.55% 78.26% 43.48% 90.91%
Listing of average stock related CAR to Long Term Rating Changes from Moody's Investor's 
Service and S&P Rating Agency
The combined sample of long term rating changes is broken down by rating type (upgrades or 
downgrades) and country, with the average stock related CAR of long term rating events in each country 
for that rating type listed.   Overall country results are considered to be in the correct direction if the rating 
type is a downgrade and the average stock related CAR for all rating types for that country is negative, or 
if the rating type is an upgrade and the average stock related CAR for all rating types for that country is 
positive.  Emerging Dummy is 1 if the country is classified as emerging in the Morgan Stanley Capital 
Index
Table 14 Panel A:  Developed Markets
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Country Positive Credit Watch Stock Related CAR
Negative Credit 
Watch Stock 
Related CAR
Long Term 
Upgrade Stock 
Related CAR
Long Term 
Downgrade Stock 
Related CAR
ARGENTINA -0.30% -1.28% 0.05% -2.87%
BRAZIL 0.01% 0.77% -1.28% -0.16%
CHILE N/A -0.15% -0.53% -1.00%
CHINA 3.40% -3.44% 1.71% 0.40%
HUNGARY 0.01% 0.13% -0.33% -0.23%
INDIA 0.83% -0.70% -0.08% 5.43%
INDONESIA -0.59% 0.61% -1.88% 0.90%
ISRAEL N/A -2.33% 2.00% 3.34%
KOREA -0.47% 0.53% 1.33% 2.36%
MALAYSIA -0.55% 0.52% -0.07% -1.09%
MEXICO -0.43% -2.30% 0.05% -1.48%
PHILIPPINES 2.75% 0.28% -1.06% -0.17%
POLAND N/A -12.23% -0.68% 7.29%
RUSSIA 1.39% 0.83% -1.03% -2.33%
SOUTH AFRICA N/A -0.83% N/A 3.00%
TAIWAN N/A -3.35% 0.20% -0.79%
THAILAND 3.77% -1.62% 1.26% -1.51%
TURKEY -7.00% -21.00% 1.45% -1.00%
# of countries 13 18 17 18
# of countries with 
average returns in the 
correct direction (i.e. > 0 
for positive watch and 
upgrades, and < 0 for 
negative watch and 
downgrades)
7 11 8 11
# of countries with 
significant results (at 
2.5% level of 
significance)
2 4 1 4
% of countries with 
average returns in 
correct direction
53.85% 61.11% 47.06% 61.11%
Table 14 Panel B:  Emerging Markets
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12. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
We examine the informational content of being placed on Moody’s and 
S&P’s watch lists using a comprehensive database of credit watch placements, 
and also bond rating changes for non US domiciled companies.  We analyze 
the informational content in 3 ways – first, we examine stock related CAR from 
separate samples of credit watch placements and also bond rating changes 
over a 3 days (-1, +1) window centered on the actual credit watch / rating 
change on day 0.   
 
Secondly, we examine the linked samples of credit watches that are 
resolved by expected rating changes, and also the unlinked samples, where the 
rating changes are unexpected.  Thirdly, we analyze the samples by various 
partitions, include emerging / developed markets, investment grade transition / 
non-investment grade transition and state of local MSCI country index.   
 
Being placed on a credit watch list is, by itself an informative event.  
Additionally, negative credit watches appear to carry a greater informational 
content compared to positive credit watches – this could be due to the 
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explanation offered in Goh & Ederington (1993) that companies are more 
proactive in disseminating positive news compared to negative news.  Long 
term rating downgrades on the whole also result in a significant negative stock 
related CAR.  Positive credit watch and upgrades on the whole generally do not 
result in significant reactions. 
 
Reactions to negative credit watch and long term rating downgrades are 
generally less pronounced (i.e. more positive) for companies domiciled in 
emerging markets compared to developed markets.  This could be because of 
greater information leakage (e.g. through insider trading, etc) in emerging 
markets that result in bad news being disseminated more rapidly than in 
developed markets.  Additionally, surprised long term downgrades and 
informative negative credit watches all result in stock related CAR that are more 
pronounced (i.e. more negative) than expected long term downgrades and 
uninformative negative credit watches – the same is true for both developed 
and emerging markets.  Reactions to credit watches and long term rating 
changes also appear positively related to the contemporaneous return on the 
MSCI local country index.  Lastly, long term rating downgrades that result in a 
transition from investment grade to non-investment grade generally exhibit a 
more negative stock-related CAR.   
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Going forward, it may be interesting to analyze average stock-related 
CAR at the country level and also partitioned by national regulatory 
characteristics at the aggregate level.  This could help to identify which specific 
national regulations that mandate corporate disclosure, regulate insider trading, 
and enforce corporate transparency impact the additional informational content 
that bond rating changes and credit watch provide to investors. 
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APPENDIX A: THE BEHRENS – FISHER PROBLEM 
 
The Behrens – Fisher problem involves interval estimation and 
hypothesis testing on the difference of means of two normally distributed 
populations, when the variances of the 2 populations may not be equal.  We note 
that it is assumed that the 2 populations are independent. 
 
Behrens and Fisher proposed to find the probability distribution of 
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Fisher proposed initially that the distribution of this statistic can be 
approximated by ignoring random variation in the relative sides of the standard 
deviations, as in: 
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Welch (1938) approximated the distribution by the Type III Pearson 
distribution, applying this to the following number of degrees of freedom: 
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The null hypothesis would then involve the expectation of equality, 
µµ 21 = , so the distribution of the Behrens Fisher statistic, T, which will also 
depend on the variance ratio (of both distributions) can now be approximated by 
the Student’s t distribution with v degrees of freedom. 
